Olson v. Utah Department of Health : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Olson v. Utah Department of Health : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nan T. Bassett; Kip & Christian; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Peggy E. Stone; Assistant Utah Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General;
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Olson v. Utah Department of Health, No. 20080937 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1282
No. 20080937
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________________________________
JULIE ANN OLSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Defendant and Petitioner.
__________________________________________________________________
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S OPENING BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
Interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion for summary 
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto presiding
__________________________________________________________________
NAN T. BASSETT
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 4  FLOORTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
PEGGY E. STONE (6658)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
PO Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
-ii-
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
All of the parties are listed on the cover of this Brief.
-iii-
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Jurisdiction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Issue Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Preservation of issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Nature of the Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
-iv-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES
Blackner v. Dep’t of Transp., 2002 UT 44,  48 P.3d 949 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 8
Draughon v. Dept. of Fin. Inst., 1999 UT App. 42, 975 P.2d 935 . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc., v. Mountain                    
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, 61 P.2d 989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Pace v. St. George City Police Dep’t, 2006 UT App. 494,  153 P.3d 789 .. . . . . . . 8
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-201(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
No. 20080937
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________________________________
JULIE ANN OLSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Defendant and Petitioner.
__________________________________________________________________
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S OPENING BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
JURISDICTION
This Court possesses jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah
Code Ann.  § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (granting Court
jurisdiction over orders in appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the Career Service Review Board). 
On December 8, 2008, this Court entered an order granting the
Department of Health’s (DOH) petition for interlocutory appeal from
the denial of its motion for summary judgment.  R. 177.   
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ISSUE PRESENTED
The Utah State Personnel Management Act defines demotion as a
“disciplinary action resulting in a reduction of an employee’s current
actual wage” and provides that a “nondisciplinary movement of an
employee to another position without a reduction in the current actual
wage” is not a demotion.  Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-3(7)(a), (b).  Here, the
district court construed the statute to provide that a transfer could be a
demotion even if it did not result in a reduction of an employee’s current
actual wage if it was a “disciplinary transfer.”  Did the District Court
properly construe Section 67-19-3(7)?
A. Standard of review
A district court’s denial of summary judgment based on
undisputed facts constitues a ruling of law, which this Court reviews for
correctness, without deference to the district court.  Estate Landscape &
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc., v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844
P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992).  And this Court reviews a district court’s
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interpretation of a statute for correctness.  Blackner v. Dep’t of Transp.,
2002 UT 44, ¶8, 48 P.3d 949. 
B. Preservation of issue
DOH raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment. R. 79;
84-87.  The district court entered a Memorandum Decision denying the
motion on October 27, 2008. R. 167-171.  A copy of that order is
attached as Addendum A. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutory provision is attached as Addendum B to
this brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of
DOH’s motion for summary judgment.  Olson sought judicial review of
the CSRB Administrator’s decision that the CSRB lacked jurisdiction
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over her grievance. R. 1-22.  The district court ruled that it had to
determine whether Olson’s transfer was disciplinary before it concluded
whether the CSRB properly dismissed the grievance.  R. 170.    
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Olson filed a grievance with the CSRB after DOH demoted her.  
R. 3; 83.  But before the CSRB hearing, DOH rescinded Olson’s
demotion and restored Olson to her pay level at the time of the
demotion and restored all benefits associated with the restoration of
salary, including back-pay, retirement and 401k contributions.  R. 83;
102.  DOH also moved to dismiss the CSRB action, arguing that
because Olson suffered no reduction in “current actual pay” she was not
demoted and therefore the CSRB lacked jurisdiction over the grievance. 
R. 83; 104-05.  
The CSRB administrator conducted an administrative review of
the file and agreed with DOH that Olson was not demoted. R. 84  He
dismissed the case based on a lack of jurisdiction.  R. 108-115.  A copy of
that order is attached as Addendum C. 
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Olson sought judicial review with the district court. R. 1-22.  DOH
filed a motion for summary judgment.  R. 79-80.  After full briefing and
oral argument, R. 166, the district court denied the motion on October
21, 2008.  R. 167-170.  DOH timely filed a petition for interlocutory
appeal, R. 178, and this Court granted the petition on December 8,
2008.  R. 177.  
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to September 27, 2006, DOH employed Olson as the Director
of the Bureau of Managed Health Care.  R. 3; 82.  On July 27, 2006,
Olson received a proposed disciplinary action in the form of a demotion
dated July 19, 2006.  R. 3; 82.  On August 1, 2006, Olson submitted a
reply to the proposed disciplinary action and was granted a hearing
before Dr. Richard Melton regarding the proposed demotion.  R. 3; 82.
On September 25, 2006, Dr. David Sundwall, DOH’s Executive
Director, issued a final decision approving the discipline and instituting
a demotion.  R. 3; 83.  Olson was reassigned to research assistant
position and her current pay was reduced one step or eighty cents (.80)
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per hour.  R. 3; 83; 99-100.  In October, Olson filed a request for agency
action before the CSRB challenging her demotion.  R. 3; 83.  The CSRB
set an evidentiary hearing on the grievance for May 22 and 23, 2007.   
R. 4; 83.
Before the hearing, DOH advised Olson that it was rescinding her
demotion, that her one step pay decrease would be reinstated back to
September 27, 2006, and that all benefits associated with the restoration
of salary, including retirement and 401k contributions, would be
restored.  R. 4; 83; 102.  Olson would continue in the research assistant
position at the same pay level and with precisely the same benefits she
had enjoyed prior to the rescinded demotion.  R. 83; 102.
On the same date, DOH filed a motion to dismiss the grievance
before the CSRB arguing that the CSRB lacked jurisdiction because
DOH had rescinded Olson’s demotion.  R. 83; 104-05.  On June 7, 2007,
Mr. Robert Thompson, the CSRB administrator, issued his order
dismissing the grievance because DOH’s actions constituted an
administrative transfer and not a demotion since there was no loss of
any current actual wage.  R. 84; 108-15.  Olson appealed Administrator
Thompson’s decision to the Third Judicial District Court.  R. 1-22.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The CSRB correctly dismissed Olson’s grievance for lack of
jurisdiction because Olson was not demoted.   Section 67-19-3(7)
provides that a demotion occurs only when the employee suffers a
reduction in current actual wage.  DOH rescinded Olson’s demotion
when it restored her pay, awarded her her back-pay, and restored all
associated retirement benefits and 401k contributions associated with
that pay.  The district court erred when it construed the statute to create
an additional definition for demotion to include “disciplinary transfers”
without a reduction in current actual wage. 
ARGUMENT
The CSRB has exclusive and limited administrative jurisdiction to
hear career service employees’ grievances relating only to termination,
suspension or demotion.  See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-201(1). Olson’s
transfer did not constitute a termination or suspension and, therefore,
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the only basis that the CSRB could have had jurisdiction over her
grievance was if her transfer was a demotion.
Thus, this case turns on the meaning of “demotion” found in Utah
Code Ann.  § 67-19-3(7)(a) (West Supp. 2008).  The statute provides that:
7(a) “Demotion” means a disciplinary action resulting in a 
reduction of an employee’s current actual wage.
   (b) “Demotion” does not mean:
(i) a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to
another position without a reduction in the current
actual wage; or
(ii) a reclassification of an employee’s position under the
provisions of Subsection 67-19-12(3) and rules made by
the department.
(Emphasis added).  
When this Court interprets any statute, the rules of statutory
construction require the Court to look first “to the statute’s plain
language, and give effect to the plain language, unless the language is
ambiguous.” Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at ¶ 12.  And the Court gives “effect
to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” Pace v.
St. George City Police Dep’t, 2006 UT App. 494, ¶ 6, 153 P.3d 789. 
Here, the statute’s plain language is clear and unambiguous.  A
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demotion requires a reduction in current actual pay, and without that
pay reduction, there is no demotion.  
Prior to 2006, the Legislature left the term demotion undefined. 
But the Department of Human Recourse Management (DHRM)
promulgated rules defining demotion.  The DHRM rules drew a
distinction between an involuntary transfer, which was not greivable,
and a demotion, which was.  To be a demotion, the rule required that
there be a reduction in the actual current pay.
DHRM’s distinction was tested in 1999 by this Court in Draughon
v. Dept. of Fin. Inst., 1999 UT App. 42, 975 P.2d 935.  In Draughon, the
grievant had been transferred from the position of Financial Institutions
Manager to Financial Institutions Specialist.  Although grievant’s
“current pay” was unchanged, the new position was arguably less
prestigious and had a lower pay range associated with it.  The CSRB,
just as it did in this case, denied the grievant a hearing on the basis that
it lacked jurisdiction over what it viewed as an involuntary
administrative transfer instead of a demotion.  Id. at ¶ 3.
This Court reversed, finding that the Utah Personnel Management
Act did not support DHRM’s definition of demotion, nor did the Act draw
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the distinction between demotion and involuntary transfer found in the
DHRM rule.  Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.  At that time, the only section of the Act
defining demotion was § 67-19-18(1), which stated that career service
employees may be dismissed or demoted “to advance the good of the
public service” or “for  just cause[s].”  Id. at ¶ 6.  The Act imposed no
other clear definition of demotion, and the Draughon court fashioned its
own.  The court found that an involuntary transfer to a new position was
a demotion if the new position “has less status, fewer responsibilities, a
lower pay range, and will ultimately result in commensurately lower
retirement benefits” even if the grievant suffered “no immediate loss of
pay.”  Id. at ¶ 10.
In 2006, and with the Draughon decision before it, the Legislature
amended the Act to specifically define “demotion.”  Following DHRM’s
rule prior to Draughon, the Legislature determined that in order to be a
“demotion,” a disciplinary action must result “in a reduction of an
employee’s current actual wage.”  Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(a).  
The 2006 amendment also addressed and rejected the Draughon
court’s holding that a transfer resulting in a loss of duties or to a less
prestigious position, or a transfer to a position which was on a lower
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wage scale, should be defined as a demotion even though no current
wages were actually lost.  Pursuant to § 67-19-3(7)(b), a movement or
transfer of an employee from one position to another “without a
reduction in the current actual wage” is, by definition, a “nondisciplinary
movement” and not a demotion.  By amendment, the Legislature
restored DHRM’s distinction between an involuntary transfer and a
demotion.
The 2006 legislative amendment foreclosed the avenue used by the
Draughon court to define demotion. In Draughon, because there was no
legislative definition of demotion, the court took the opportunity to
construct its own.  The Legislature has now filled that void, rejected the
Draughon court’s definition, and defined the term “demotion” consistent
with the original DHRM rule.  Simply, if there is no loss in the
employee’s current actual wage, a transfer or reassignment is not a
demotion, whether disciplinary or not.
The district court below used § 67-19-3(7)(b)(i) to create its own
additional definition of demotion for what the district court called a
“disciplinary transfer” even if there was no reduction in the current
actual wage.  The statute does not support such an exception. Subsection
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(a) makes it clear that a “disciplinary action” can be a demotion only if it
results in a reduction of current actual wages.  Subsection (b) responded
to the Draughon court’s holding that a transfer could be a demotion even
if it did not result in a reduction in the current actual wage, if it resulted
in a loss of duties or prestige or a shift to a different pay scale. 
Subsection (b)(i) merely addresses and rejects that holding.  It provides
that a transfer cannot be a demotion if it is: 1) nondisciplinary; and 2)
“without a reduction in the actual current wage.”
The district court ignored the statute’s plain language.  A demotion
requires an accompanying loss of current actual pay.  The district court
created an additional definition of “demotion” and thereby improperly
expanded the CSRB’s limited jurisdiction. 
Neither the trial court nor this Court can “ignore or strike down an
act because it is either wise or unwise.  The wisdom or lack of wisdom is
for the legislature to determine.”  Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ¶ 22,
61 P.2d 989 (quoting Masich v.United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining
Co., 113 Utah 101, 126, 119 P.2d 612 (1948)).  The district court’s
decision should be reversed.  
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CONCLUSION
The district court improperly ignored the statute’s plain language
to create an additional definition of demotion.  This Court should reject
the district court’s faulty statutory construction and reverse the district
court’s denial of DOH’s motion for summary judgment.
Dated this _____ day of February, 2009.
___________________________________
PEGGY E. STONE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner Utah 
Department of Health
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